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POLITICS 
The Death and Life of the 
Jewish Century 
The resurgence of anti-Semitism today is not a quirk of Donald Trump. As a 
new book shows, it has deep roots in powerful institutions. 
BENJAMIN BALTHASER 
Image: flickr / Eric Allix Rogers 
A Specter Haunting Europe: The Myth of Judeo-Bolshevism 
Paul Hanebrink 
Harvard University Press, $29.95 (cloth) 
I had just reclined in my seat to read Paul Hanebrink’s new history of “the 
Judeo-Bolshevik myth” when a fight erupted a dozen seats ahead in first class. 
I couldn’t make out all that was said—something about Democrats, “fucking 
Jews,” and, of course, George Soros, the wealthy Jewish financier and 
philanthropist at the heart of many sinister anti-Semitic conspiracy theories. 
It was as if sentences from the book leapt off the page and took on human 
form. 
Suddenly anti-Semitism is back in public life—marching on college campuses, 
ranting in first class. 
The twenty-something by the window next to me—with a mop of curly black 
hair (Jewish, I assumed), wearing a “No Person is Illegal” T-shirt—was both 
appalled and incredulous. “Who talks like that,” he said with a bent smile. The 
man sandwiched between us responded “plenty,” adding that he grew up in 
South Bend, Indiana. I knew what he meant: I had been the only Jew in most 
of my public school classes growing up in rural California. 
One could say the incident served as a concise summary of the past two years. 
From the Tree of Life massacre to Donald Trump tweets featuring a six-
pointed star over piles of cash, suddenly anti-Semitism is back in public life—
marching on college campuses, ranting in first class. The responses of the two 
people sitting next to me exemplify conflicting responses of the left-liberal 
public to this new phenomenon: anti-Semitism has always been here, and 
anti-Semitism is a specter from the past. 
Both statements are true, but they also seem insufficient. As the postwar 
liberal order crumbles, we are witnessing a radical shift in the structure of 
anti-Semitism. Its resurgence today is not a quirk of Trump, and it is not a 
response to Israel’s ever-more grotesque forms of apartheid, though both are 
entwined with these epochal changes. It is, instead, the result of one world 
order collapsing, and another struggling to be born. 
 
Both the liberal and radical left have long been troubled by anti-Semitism, not 
least because Zionists have deftly mobilized claims of anti-Semitism to deflect 
criticism of Israel, like some kind of discursive Iron Dome. Yet even beyond 
pro-Israel hasbara, the concept of anti-Semitism remains complicated, 
upsetting frameworks relied on to understand race in the United States. The 
Women’s March has only deepened this crisis of definitions, as has the 
recent controversy over Representative Ilhan Omar’s tweets. The charge of 
anti-Semitism can now be applied, it seems, to white nationalists and left-wing 
anti-racists alike. 
To liberals, anti-Semitism is something “deplorables” engage in, presumably 
because they have not been to college or attended a Tim Wise anti-bias 
training. 
The defect in the liberal view of anti-Semitism is the same as the defect in the 
liberal view of all forms of racist and ethnic oppression: construing it as a 
matter of personal psychology rather than structural or institutional injustice, 
the likes of which can be fixed through education and legislation. On this view, 
anti-Semitism, like racism against African Americans or anti-queer bias, is 
something “deplorables” engage in, presumably because they have not been to 
college or attended a Tim Wise anti-bias training on the job. 
The anti-racist left arrives at a similar conclusion—that anti-Semitism isn’t 
“structural”—by a different route. Where the liberal is blind to all structural 
oppression, the leftist only denies that it operates against Jews. Activist Linda 
Sarsour argued as much at a 2017 forum on anti-Semitism co-sponsored 
by Jacobin, Jewish Voice for Peace, Haymarket Books, and Jews for Racial 
and Economic Justice. Unlike racism against people of color, anti-Semitism is 
“is not codified into law,” she explained. While one might point out most 
forms of structural racism in the U.S. function within a colorblind legal 
framework, Sarsour was getting at a kind of materialist common sense around 
race most leftists share (myself included). Racism has been central to the 
regimes of capital accumulation since the country’s founding, and the law 
perpetuates these inequalities. As racial theorists Michael Omi and Howard 
Winant articulated in their groundbreaking study Racial Formation in the 
United States (1986), race is a way of constructing and mobilizing economic 
and political rule by referring to “different types of human bodies.” Anti-
Semitism, in this scheme, may be vile, unfortunate, violent, but it is not 
central to the national—even global—system of capitalism. For this reason, 
Sarsour argued, Jews should have a seat at the table among coalitions against 
racism, but they shouldn’t hold the mic. 
Where the liberal is blind to all structural oppression, the leftist only denies 
that it operates against Jews. 
Far from contradicting Sarsour, most of the scholarship on Jewish-American 
identity by progressive Jewish authors has underscored that a firm line can be 
drawn between the structural racism faced by people of color and another 
variety of racism faced by European-descended Jewish Americans. Most 
notably, Karen Brodkin’s How Jews Became White Folks (1998) charts how 
European-descended Ashkenazi Jews experienced the postwar boom the way 
most other “white ethnics” did: with expanded economic opportunity, state 
and private employment, publicly funded higher education, and access to 
suburban home loans. Other books, such as Michael Rogin’s Blackface, White 
Noise (1996) and Matt Jacobsen’s Whiteness of a Different Color (1999), trace 
similar teleologies: as for other non-WASP Europeans, the inevitable 
assimilation into whiteness is predicated on a rejection of blackness and an 
embrace of suburban segregation patterns and segregated schooling. 
Whatever historical trauma Jews may collectively bear, this line of thinking 
goes, they still generally live among white people, and they are seen as just 
other white people by African Americans. 
As useful and necessary as this work is, it has limitations, and Hanebrink 
helps to give a fuller picture. Much of the work of critical race theory that 
informs this scholarship, as well as contemporary anti-racist practice, 
emerged in the years following World War II—a time when anti-Semitism was 
at an historic low. To many on the left, it appeared that the new liberal order 
was the inevitable future: the terminus where history would end, a 
presumption Francis Fukuyama finally made fully explicit in 1992. The far 
right, though still violent, was politically marginalized. Most leftist analysis 
was directed against the postwar liberal order, articulating critiques of a 
society that embraced a colorblind logic of power. Whether Malcolm 
X’s Autobiography (1965) or Stokely Carmichael’s analysis of “institutional 
racism,” much of this work rested on the assumption that racism needed 
deconstruction, since after the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts it had taken 
on more insidious forms than overt segregation and Ku Klux Klan lynchings. 
This situation put Jews on the left in a bind, as discussions of anti-Semitism 
appeared to minimize the racist economic and political structure of U.S. 
capitalism. One could be a Bernardine Dohrn, thrown wholesale into the 
struggle against imperialism, or a Philip Roth, ironizing how deeply American 
Jews had assimilated into mainstream society, if only too well. It would be 
very easy from that vantage point to say that anti-Semitism was a problem of 
an earlier generation. (My incredulous Jewish seatmate seemed an emblem of 
this type.) 
Whatever historical trauma Jews may collectively bear, this line of thinking 
goes, they still generally live among white people. 
The eruption of anti-Semitism into public life today troubles this neat and 
orderly narrative of Jewish progress in the United States. But it is not only the 
present that poses a problem for this argument. A major flashpoint of anti-
Semitism arose at the very time when Jews were rapidly assimilating into 
white, middle-class American life—the Red Scare of the 1950s. From the late 
1940s to the mid-1950s, over half of Americans associated Jews with 
communist espionage. Six members of the Hollywood Ten were Jewish. Two-
thirds of those questioned in the 1952 McCarthy hearings were Jewish, despite 
Jews accounting for under 2 percent of the American population. 
Congressman John Rankin delighted in “unmasking” the Jewish names of 
Hollywood actors and directors while under HUAC investigation, and of 
course, the only two people ever executed on federal espionage charges during 
the Cold War, the Rosenbergs, were Jewish. Major liberal Jewish 
organizations such as the American Jewish Committee (AJC) and the Anti-
Defamation League (ADL) were quick to distance themselves from Jewish 
Americans accused of being communists. My own grandparents, Jewish 
members of the Communist Party, referred to the Red Scare as an American 
pogrom. 
My point is not that anti-Semitism is a transcendent force in U.S. history, free 
from historical fact or context; quite the opposite. Yet this history does 
complicate the structural/non-structural binary laid out by the anti-racist left. 
If Jews are simply other white people, we might imagine anti-Semitism would 
have gone the way of anti-Polish and anti-Italian racism—still alive in corners, 
but no longer a political force. 
How, then, are we to understand a term that on the right has come to mean 
any criticism of the state of Israel, and on the left complicated by Ashkenazi 
Jewish whiteness? And perhaps more importantly, how do we understand its 
reemergence into public life, from the European far right to Trump? 
 
Anti-Semitism can be hard to talk about in part because, as April Rosenblum 
writes in her influential pamphlet “The Past Didn’t Go Anywhere,” it doesn’t 
look like other forms of racial and religious prejudice. After all, anti-Semitism 
often expresses itself in charges not of inferiority, but of superiority: Jews are 
portrayed as clever and powerful. As Hanebrink shows, far-right movements 
share a theory of Jewish power that crystallized in the twentieth century as 
“Judeo-Bolshevism”—the theory that twentieth-century communism was 
simply the latest iteration of “Jewish power,” deployed to undermine the 
Christian West. Unlike other racial ideologies that focus on the seizure of 
bodies and the maintenance of a hierarchy based on physical appearance, anti-
Semitism is a theory of society, how it is constructed and for what ends. 
The eruption of anti-Semitism into public life today troubles the neat and 
orderly narrative of Jewish progress in the United States. 
Indeed, anti-Semitism may not even need actual Jews to function, as we are 
learning from the rebirth of radical right in Poland—a land so thoroughly 
ethnically cleansed, old Jewish gravestones have been used to pave 
streets. When right-wing protesters demanded Polish Prime Minister 
Andrzej Duda take off his yarmulke, they did not think he is actually Jewish. 
When the alt-right marched on the University of Virginia campus last year to 
chants of “Jews will not replace us,” they are not worried about Jewish 
birthrates or Jewish immigrants “stealing” jobs. 
For the right, Jews are understood as a uniquely political threat. One does not 
clutch one’s handbag as Jews pass on the streets. Neither numerical nor 
physically strong enough to conquer the world by force, “Jewish power” relies 
on a belief in a transnational, messianic culture that unleashed the destructive 
forces of modernity: urbanization, alienation, pluralism, women’s liberation, 
and the worst of all modern ills, socialism. Thus the Soviet Union did not 
appear to the far-right governments from Spain to Hungary to Germany as 
merely an ideological enemy, but a state in which the Judeo-Bolsheviks took 
power and could bend the inferior Slavic masses to their will. As Hanebrink 
writes, Nazi conceptions of “Bolshevik Russia” were of “a Jewish-ruled Asiatic 
realm” that must be destroyed “for Germans to expand and thrive.” 
To trace the origins of “Judeo-Bolshevism” one must look to its roots in 
Christian supremacy. “In many ways,” Hanebrink writes, “the figure of the 
Jewish Bolshevik is a modern day version of medieval fables about Jewish 
devils.” He notes that the idea of a Christianity threatened by Jewish 
subversion can trace its way back to the Gospels. During the Spanish Civil 
War, fascist generals and their Catholic allies framed the conflict as a 
continuation of the reconquista, the military expulsion of Jews and Muslims 
from Spain. To the north, Poland’s Catholic bishops penned a collective letter 
at the dawn of the Bolshevik revolution warning that the “antichrist” had 
arrived on earth. The racial coordinates of that trope were made clear by 
a Polish anti-communist poster: Leon Trotsky, the Jewish leader of the 
Red Army, appears as a naked devil atop a pile of skulls, while Asiatic Red 
Army troops club a body lying beneath them. In the size of Trotsky’s body 
and his devilish appearance we are meant to see the Satanic Jew leading the 
Asian army to do his bidding. As Hanebrink articulates, the far-right anti-
Semitism of World War II imagined itself as an “anti-Communist crusade,” a 
missionary project of ridding Western civilization of “Jewish Bolshevik” 
power. 
The history of anti-Semitism complicates the structural/non-structural binary 
laid out by the anti-racist left. 
Contemporary far-right movements in the United States, whether white 
nationalist or Christian supremacist, reformulate the language of Jewish 
power for their distinctive cultural context. Perhaps the most influential single 
text for white nationalists is the 1978 Turner Diaries, published under the 
pseudonym Andrew Macdonald—a book Timothy McVeigh carried during his 
arrest after the Oklahoma City bombing. A dystopian fictional account of an 
uprising by white terrorist cells as they battle African American government 
agents, the novel features a sinister network of Jewish intelligence agencies 
and financiers that run the world from the shadows. Earl Turner, the leader of 
the white nationalist “Organization,” triumphs, and North America is 
ethnically cleansed. All white women who marry black or Jewish men are 
publicly hanged; the Soviet Union, New York City, and Tel Aviv are left in 
radioactive ash. 
This portrait of the world, in which Jews are the masterminds of an ostensibly 
African American political “System,” is little different from the European far-
right conception of the Soviet Union as an “Asiatic” land dominated by Jewish 
power. Greg Johnson, far-right journalist and editor of Counter 
Currents, summed up the meaning of Jewish power in a 2014 editorial, 
citing “the organized Jewish community” as “the principal enemy—not the 
sole enemy, but the principal enemy.” For a large part of the contemporary 
U.S. right, “The Jew” is the most fundamental explanation of modern liberal 
democracy—its racial base, you could say, or what the circulation of value 
would be for a Marxist. 
The language of modern Jewish power has long found its way into mainstream 
right-wing politics. Whether Ted Cruz decrying “New York values,” or Fox 
News claiming “anti-Christian bias” in Hollywood (often by notably Jewish 
directors), a soft, dog-whistle anti-Semitism circulates easily. But in the last 
few years there has been a dramatic rise in both anti-Semitic statements and 
anti-Semitic hate crimes reported to police, rising at twice the rate of hate 
crimes against other racialized groups. The trope of the liberal 
cosmopolitan in New York and Hollywood has been refashioned into—in fact, 
as Hanebrink shows, rediscovered as—a sinister figure controlling vast armies 
of surrogate colonial subjects in a plot to topple the West. 
George Soros is only the most visible target of resurgent Judeo-Bolshevism. 
George Soros is only the most visible target of this resurgent Judeo-
Bolshevism. Both Glenn Beck, believing that Soros is behind the Obama 
presidency, and Trump, promoting the theory that Soros funded the migrant 
caravan, have a form of the Judeo-Bolshevik as their common target: a 
malevolent, invisible force subverting the nation from within, by mobilizing 
enemies from without. This is also the logic of Robert Browers; hours before 
slaughtering eleven people in the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, he who 
wrote that the Jewish American nonprofit HIAS, which provides humanitarian 
aid to refugees, “likes to bring in invaders that kill our people.” That Soros is 
both a wealthy capitalist and an advocate of liberal democracy makes sense 
only if both are seen as alien, destructive forces of modernity, undoing a 
“natural” and organic white racial community. 
 
The question is, why now? Hanebrink provides intriguing clues, noting that 
after World War II, Jews in the United States were offered “communal 
membership” in liberal, mainstream society—so long as they renounced 
Communism and defined their identity along normative religious lines. A 
group of postwar German theologians theorized this new inclusion by 
replacing the “Judeo-Bolshevik” threat with “Judeo-Christian” society, 
enlisting liberal Jews in their fight against atheistic, Asiatic Communism. By 
framing both Nazism and Communism as threats to the liberal, Christian 
order of the West, Jews in the United States often became willing conscripts in 
the democratic fight against third-world revolution and Communist 
conspiracy. Embracing the Judeo-Christian ideal, the liberal AJC and ADL 
joined the anti-Communist witch-hunts of the McCarthy era by refusing to 
defend Jewish communists, and even advocating for the execution of the 
Rosenbergs. For the first time, liberal Jewish intellectuals, from Daniel 
Ellsberg to Lionel Trilling, saw the U.S. state as the guarantor of Jewish 
wellbeing, provided “anti-Communism” was embraced as “a criterion of 
Jewish communal membership.” Ethnic studies scholars such as myself might 
refer to this new sense of liberal, democratic belonging as “whiteness.” 
While Hanebrink does not address the question of Zionism other than to note 
that most left-wing, secular Jews opposed it prior to World War II, Israel has 
played a major role in normalizing Jewish identity among Western 
governments and elites. Israel not only territorialized the transnational, 
diasporic Jewish subject; it has also joined “the West” in combatting its own 
series of racialized, systematic threats—socialist pan-Arab nationalism in the 
1950s and 1960s, and now the “Islamic” threat represented by Hezbollah, 
Iran, and Hamas. As the “only democracy in the Middle East” (a 
characterization wielded by many U.S. politicians), Israel was represented as a 
liberal, Western outpost among the Oriental barbarians of Nasser’s armies and 
Iran’s Shia clerics. If “Judeo-Christian civilization was a central feature of Cold 
War liberal rhetoric,” as Hanebrink argues, then Israel, both as the entrance of 
Jews into the order of Westphalian statehood and the Cold War battlefields 
from Lebanon to Nicaragua, also marked the entrance of Jews into liberal, 
global order constructed by U.S. imperial planners at the close of World War 
II—a global analogy to Jewish assimilation in the United States. 
While U.S. military and diplomatic support for Israel may be peripheral to the 
global rise of the right, it is nonetheless clear that the postwar liberal imperial 
order of both Bretton Woods and NATO—in which Israel became a key link—is 
under severe strain. Israel is increasingly seen less as the Middle East’s lone 
democracy than as the last apartheid state, with a grafing, corrupt elite 
of its own. Closer to home, the postwar liberal order, with its ideology of 
colorblind democracy and equal opportunity for all, is not so much under 
threat as collapsing under the weight of its own contradictions. The profit 
squeeze of the 1970s meant that capitalism could no longer afford both an 
ample welfare state and an expanding share of the profits for the ruling elite, 
so it ditched the former while doubling down on the latter. 
In many powerful U.S. institutions, from the evangelical church to the 
Republican Party, anti-Semitic thought is a regular staple of analysis. 
The rise of Trump, as with the rise of illiberal governments from Hungary to 
Russia to India, should be understood as a response to the crisis of liberalism. 
And with the end of the postwar welfare state, so too are we seeing the end of 
liberal order in which Jews, so briefly it may have seemed, found an unmarked 
home, one in which their identity was understood not only as normative but 
foundational to the global system:  what Yuri Slezkine referred to as “the 
Jewish Century.” When Trump calls the departing Jewish economic 
advisor, Gary Cohn, a “globalist,” a term he has used several times to 
mock critics of economic nationalism, he is not only Jew-baiting; he is 
signifying the end of the “Judeo-Christian” order in which someone like Cohn 
may be seen as a representative. It is not a coincidence that the most anti-
Semitic members of Trump’s cabinet are also the most critical of 
globalized capitalism. Steve Bannon, who was the architect of Trump’s 
electoral campaign, not only cited “free trade and immigration” as 
Trump’s winning issues but ran hit pieces from his editorial post at 
Breitbart complaining of “renegade Jews,” to say nothing of the 
journal’s obsession with Soros. 
 
Does all this mean that anti-Semitism is structural? Not quite, if by 
“structural” we mean codified into law, or materially necessary for the 
reproduction of capitalism. On this point, it is useful to draw a distinction 
between structural and institutional forms of oppression. Ashkenazi Jews in 
the United States are, by and large, educated and middle-class, and most 
European-descended Jews experience the United States as white people, with 
all the racial privilege—and racism—that go along with it. They do not suffer 
from mass incarceration and residential segregation. Nevertheless anti-
Semitism is institutional: in many powerful U.S. institutions, from the 
evangelical church to the Republican Party (to say nothing of a more radical 
far right), anti-Semitic thought is a regular staple of analysis. Anti-Semitism is 
not an aberration for these groups, but part of their foundational ideology. We 
cannot oppose the right without also opposing—and understanding—the right-
wing origins of anti-Semitic thought. 
There is no ideological framework in which anti-Semitism explains or informs 
a socialist internationalist practice. 
If there is a silver lining to viewing the “Judeo-Bolshevik myth” as an 
archeology of the present, it is that we can begin to disentangle much of the 
confusion around the term, from the scandals rocking Ilhan Omar and Jeremy 
Corbyn to the BDS movement and the Women’s March. While individual 
progressives may indeed be anti-Semitic, and should be called out for anti-
Semitic comments and actions, Hanebrink reminds us that there is no 
ideological framework in which anti-Semitism explains or informs a socialist 
internationalist practice. Unlike Palestine solidarity activists, or African 
American feminists, the Christian and secular right do pose real threats to 
ongoing Jewish thriving in the United States, do exercise real power, and do 
commit regular acts of violence. Unless the political and economic conditions 
of global capitalism are challenged by a multi-ethnic, transnational left, the 
mainstream Jewish establishment may look to an increasingly far-right Israel 
for protection, even as its apartheid state allies with fascists from Brazil to 
Ukraine to secure its crumbling world image. 
This path is disaster, both for Jews and the left. 
 
